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ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini merupakan pengembangan dari Mahadwartha (2002b) yang mengguna-
kan Logit model untuk mengetahui kemampuan prediksi kebijakan leverage dan dividen 
terhadap kepemilikan manajerial. Variabel leverage dan dividen sudah memisahkan antara 
kepentingan manajemen dan inside shareholders dengan outside shareholders. Penelitian 
ini juga menggunakan logit model, dengan modifikasi utama yaitu variabel kepemilikan 
manajerial menggunakan lead satu tahun kedepan (t+1), penambahan variabel kontrol 
aktiva lancar untuk meningkatkan kemampuan prediksi model dan periode sampel dari 
tahun 1993 sampai dengan 2001.  
Penelitian-penelitian sebelumnya hanya menggunakan variabel kepemilikan manajerial 
tanpa lead satu tahun kedepan (t+1). Penelitian ini berargumentasi bahwa kebijakan utang 
dan dividen mempunyai dampak yang lebih besar pada kepemilikan manajerial satu tahun 
kedepan (t+1) dibandingkan tahun yang berjalan (t0).  
Hasil penelitian menunjukkan konsistensi kemampuan prediksi kebijakan leverage serta 
dividen terhadap kepemilikan manajerial, dan kemampuan prediksi leverage dan dividen 
semakin meningkat dibandingkan penelitian Mahadwartha (2002b) yang hanya mengguna-
kan kepemilikan manajerial tanpa lead (t0). Hubungan variabel leverage dan dividen 
dengan kepemilikan manajerial adalah negatif dengan besaran yang semakin meningkat. 
Hal ini sesuai dengan prediksi oleh teori keagenan bahwa terdapat efek substitusi antara 
kepemilikan manajerial dengan kebijakan utang dan dividen dalam mekanisme 
pengawasan (monitoring) dan pengikatan (bonding). Hasil ini juga menunjukkan bahwa 
kebijakan utang dan dividen lebih baik dalam menjelaskan program kepemilikan 
manajerial satu tahun kedepan. 
Kata Kunci: agency theory; lead; managerial ownership; leverage; dividend. 
 
BACKGROUND 
The agency relationship is one of the eldest 
and the commonest codified modes of social 
interaction. Examples of agency are universal. 
Essentially all contractual arrangements, as 
between employer and employee or the state 
and the governed contains important element 
of agency. Agency theory viewed firm as a set 
of contracts among factors of production, with 
each factor motivated by its self-interest. The 
self-interest controlled is main issue that tries 
to explain by agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Manager’s interest must 
align with shareholders interest to minimize 
the agency cost. Managerial ownership is one 
issue used to control such self-interest 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen, Solberg 
and Zorn, 1992; Myers, 1977; Leland and 
Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977; Mahadwartha, 2002a; 
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Mahadwartha, 2002b; Mahadwartha and 
Hartono, 2002).  
Managerial ownership is a remuneration 
program that is used to reduce the agency 
conflict between shareholders and managers. 
Murphy (1985), Brickley, Lease and Smith 
(1988), and Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
explained how fixed compensations package 
and contingent (bonuses share and option-
related) proved to be an effective incentive to 
align shareholders interest with managers. 
Managerial ownership is a contingent compen-
sation package. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) conclude that 
agency conflict arise from separation of 
ownership and control within firm. Outside 
equityholders will monitor management, to 
guarantee them from acting self-interest 
behavior. Shareholders, debtholders and 
management (managers) are parties that have 
different interest and perspective regarding 
value of the firm. Shareholders will tend to 
maximize their shares, forcing managers to act 
in their interest despite of debtholders interest. 
Debtholders on the other side will protect their 
fund already placed in firm with covenant and 
strict monitoring policy.  
Agency theory derives from the conflict of 
interest between corporate managers, outside 
shareholders and bondholders. Managerial 
ownership, leverage and dividend policies 
might be related directly through agency 
theories. Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide 
an analysis of the effect of agency conflicts 
among the three groups. Their analysis 
suggests that the proportion of equity 
controlled by insiders should influence the 
firm’s policies. 
Leverage is relevant because using debt 
reduces the conflict of having outside equity. 
Managerial ownership and dividend are 
relevant because they reduce the conflict of 
interest between managers and outside 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen, Solberg 
and Zorn, 1992; Myers, 1977). Leland and 
Pyle (1977), and Ross (1977) present hypo-
theses that managerial ownership and financial 
policies help resolve informational asymmetry 
between managers and external investors 
(outside shareholders). 
Mahadwartha (2002a), Mahadwartha 
(2002b), and Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002) 
investigate interdependency of leverage and 
dividend policy with managerial ownership, 
and find significant result that support agency 
theory. The three previous papers used 
different approach but came with the same 
conclusion about managerial ownership. This 
paper inversely tries to investigate the 
relationship between managerial ownership 
with dividend and leverage policy without any 
interdependency relationship between those 
two policies. The result hopefully supports the 
last three papers that managerial ownership 
does matter controlling agency problem in 
Indonesia. 
Financial policies such as dividend and 
leverage will affect managerial policy and 
decision of managers to join as owner of the 
firm. Mahadwartha (2002); Mahadwartha 
(2002b), Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002), 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989), and Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992) tested the issue with 
different perspectives and variables.  
Mahadwartha (2002a), Mahadwartha 
(2002b), and Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002) 
used Indonesian data and find a significant 
result and support of managerial ownership to 
control agency cost of equity and agency cost 
of debt. The main differences between these 
two studies are in firm specific variables, 
observation and period of analysis. 
Mahadwatha (2002b) used the same method as 
this paper but shorter time horizon, exclude 
current asset as control variable and without 
explanation of predictability power of leverage 
and dividend to managerial ownership one-
year later. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found strong 
support that managerial ownership would tend 
to influence firm specifics variables and on the 
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long run suggest that it will influence dividend 
and leverage policy. Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 
(1992) directly tested relationship between 
managerial ownership and financial policies 
(dividend and leverage). They found that 
managerial ownership influenced financial 
policies but financial policies did not influence 
managerial ownership. Conclusion of four 
previous study is high managerial ownership 
will derive firms to lower debt and dividend. 
The study conduct here will test inversely 
about the relationship between policies 
(dividend and leverage) influenced managerial 
ownership.  
Dividend and leverage policy variables 
used in the study is the same as Mahadwartha 
(2002a), Mahadwartha (2002b), and 
Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002). Dividend 
and leverage variables already separate the 
effect of inside shareholders wealth and 
agent’s wealth with outside shareholders 
wealth. The main difference from other studies 
is one-year lead for managerial ownership, 
because change in leverage and dividend 
policy will have bigger effect on managerial 
ownership in latter year not in current year. 
The measurement suggests increasing 
predictability power of leverage and dividend 
policy to managerial ownership.  
The paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 
reviews the relevant issues and empirical 
findings of managerial ownership. Section 3 
describes hypothesis development and a brief 
literature review. Section 4 describes 
methodology used in the study. Section 5 
describes the results from statistical analysis. 
Summary and discussion are presented in 
Section 6. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Ross (1973) noted than an agency 
relationship has arisen between two (or more) 
parties when one, designated as the agents, acts 
for, on behalf of, or as representative for the 
other, designated the principal, in a particular 
domain of decision problems. Fama (1980) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) defined that agency theory 
concerned with resolving two problems that 
can occur in agency relationship. The first is 
the agency problem that arises when the 
interests or goals of the principal and agent 
conflicted and it is difficult or expensive for 
principal to verify what the agent is actually 
doing. The second is the problem of risk 
sharing that arises when the principal and 
agent have different attitudes toward risk. 
Difference in risk preferences leads to different 
policy decisions and disregard the value 
maximizing activity as the economics pursued.  
Separation between ownership and control 
arise agency problem. Managerial ownership 
on the other side, try to decrease agency 
problem by pooling back the ownership 
structure and control mechanism of the firm. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) describe the 
importance of ownership structure as control 
mechanism in agency problem. The use of debt 
financing can improve performance by 
inducing monitoring by lenders. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) also investigated firm 
performance and mechanism to control agency 
problems. The findings support managerial 
ownership as mechanism of control and affect 
firm performance. 
Relationship of Leverage Policy to 
Managerial Ownership 
One way to control agency cost is for firm 
to issue debt. Leverage policy serves as a 
bonding mechanism for managers to convey 
their good intentions to outside shareholders. 
Debt validates that managers are willing to risk 
of losing control of the firm if they fail to pay 
firm debt. Megginson (1997: 335) mention as 
bonding mechanism, leverage policy will 
decrease agency cost of equity but increase the 
agency cost of debt.  
Is leverage policy attracting firm to involve 
in managerial ownership program one-year 
later? This question is not answered from 
previous study (Mahadwartha, 2002a; 
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Mahadwartha, 2002b; Mahadwartha and 
Hartono, 2002).  
Friend and Lang (1988), Crutchley and 
Hansen (1989), and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 
(1992) find a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership influenced leverage 
policies. Firm with managerial ownership 
program will tend to lower their debt level to 
reduce agency cost of debt and simultaneously 
reduce agency cost of equity. The result also 
support by Mahadwartha (2002a), and 
Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002). 
The relationship between leverage policy 
and managerial ownership programs will be 
negative one year afterwards. Mahadwartha 
(2002b) only answer the predictability power 
of leverage policy to managerial ownership for 
current year. Less leverage will increase the 
probability a firm to engage in managerial 
ownership program one-year later to multiply 
the effect of reduced agency cost of debt with 
the reduction in agency cost of equity. 
H1:  The relationship between leverage policy 
and managerial ownership is negative.  
Relationship of Dividend Policy to 
Managerial Ownership 
The more atomistic ownership structure, 
the fewer investors have the incentive or the 
ability to monitor and control corporate 
managers. This condition makes agency 
problems become more important. Agency cost 
or contracting model of dividend assumes that 
dividend payments arise as an attempt to 
overcome the agency problem that result when 
there is a separation of corporate ownership 
and control. 
Dividend policy as bonding mechanism, 
will decrease agency cost of equity because it 
reduce the opportunity for managers to use 
firm cash flow for perquisites activities 
(Megginson, 1997: 377). Other point of view, 
dividend payment could decrease firm ability 
to pursue new investment opportunity. Rozeff 
(1982) used American company data to 
investigate dividend policy and ownership 
structure. The findings showed that ownership 
structure affect dividend policy or how firm 
disbursed their cash in dividend payment. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992), Rozeff (1982), 
Mahadwartha (2002a), and Mahadwartha and 
Hartono (2002) find a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership influenced 
dividend policies. Firm with managerial 
ownership will tend to lower their dividend 
payment because the purpose of managerial 
ownership is the same as dividend policy that 
is to reduce agency cost of equity. It will be 
ineffective to use two tools at the same time 
for the same problem.  
Is dividend policy attracting firm to involve 
in managerial ownership program one-year 
later? Mahadwartha (2002a), Mahadwartha 
(2002b), and Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002) 
is not answer this question. Mahadwartha 
(2002b) only answer the predictability power 
of dividend policy to managerial ownership for 
current year.  
The relationship between dividend policy 
influence managerial ownership programs one-
year later will be negative. Lower dividend 
will increase the probability firm to engage in 
managerial ownership program one-year later 
and still maintain the effectiveness of reducing 
agency cost of equity. Dividend will act as 
substitution policy for managerial ownership. 
H2: The relationship between dividend policy 
and managerial ownership is negative.  
Variables dividend and leverage already 
excluded the portion of managerial, individual, 
and institutional ownership. Only the portion 
of public shareholders (outside shareholders) is 
included in variables calculation. The reasons 
are to purify variables from the effect of 
blockholders and managerial shares and 
maintain the predictability of dividend and 
leverage to managerial ownership. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
Data and Sample 
Samples are manufacture firms listed on 
Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) with period of 
observation from 1993 to 2001. Samples are 
restricted from 1993 trough 2001 up to 80 
firms, to sustain the predictability power of 
lead managerial ownership variable (1993 as 
base year samples selection). PT Inti 
Indorayon Tbk was excluded from sample 
because delisted in 2001. All data are available 
from Market Directory JSX and Pusat 
Pengembangan Akuntansi Universitas Gadjah 
Mada (PPA-UGM). Pooling data result in 640 
observations for 9-year observation period. 
Variables Description 
1. Leverage (LEVt): leverage measurement 
separates the outside shareholders wealth 
with inside shareholders wealth and agent’s 
wealth. The measurement will clarify the 
effect of outside shareholders to managerial 
ownership program. This proxy is direct 
measurement of outside financing with 
regards of outside equity financing (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). 
MvCso = TotShrso * MpriceCs 
TotShrso = total common stock outsiders 
own 
MpriceCs = average price per year with 
weekly data to reduce the 
seasonality effects from price 
changes. 
tt
t
Debt
Debt
Laverage
MvCsoLt
Lt

  
2. Dividend (DIVt): common stock dividend 
to market value of common stock (dividend 
yield) 
 
MpriceCsTotShrs
ComDiv
tt
t
t

Dividend     
3. Managerial ownership (DMOWNt+1): 
dichotomous behaviors of managerial 
ownership (binomial data) support the use 
of dummy variable lead managerial 
ownership. D=1 for firm with managerial 
ownership and vice versa. 
Control Variables 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) used 
diversification losses as variable that 
influenced manager’s decisions to engage in 
managerial ownership program. This paper 
used investment opportunity proxy by book to 
market value (IOSBMt) as control variable of 
manager’s decision in managerial ownership 
program. Firm with higher book to market 
means have lower investment opportunity. 
Lower investment opportunity will be less 
attractive for managers than firm with higher 
investment opportunity. Managers will be 
reluctant to engage in managerial ownership 
program if firm have higher book to market 
ratio. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992), Rozeff (1982), 
Megginson (1997: 376), Ang, Chua and 
McConnell (1982), Gaver and Gaver (1993), 
Mahadwartha (2002a), and Mahadwartha and 
Hartono (2002) find that size of firm affect the 
relationship between dividend, leverage and 
managerial ownership. This study also 
includes size as control variable that measure 
as dummy variable (DSIZEt). Size is measure 
from total assets, ascend and pick 50% upper 
level with D=0 and 50% lower level with D=1. 
Pooling data can cause cross sectional biased 
(Murphy, 1985).  
Economic crisis in Indonesia on 1997 also 
considered as control variable. Mahadwartha 
(2002a), Mahadwartha (2002b), and 
Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002) find that 
crisis period significantly effect model. Crisis 
period is control by dummy variable (DCRSt) 
with cut off data 1993 – 1996 and 1997 – 
2001. 
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Statistical Analysis 
Model equation is: 
DMOWNt+1 = + 1LEVt + 2DIVt + 
                        3IOSBMt + 4DSIZEt +  
                        5DCRSt + 1t 
 
Logit model will be used to solve the 
equation because dependent dummy variable 
(Gujarati, 1995: 554). The result will employ 
in term of probability of dependent variable to 
happen after independent variables. Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) is not use because 
some limitations such as questionable value of 
R
2
 and heteroscedastic variances on distur-
bances.  
Expectation-Prediction (Classification) 
table are use to estimate the correct prediction 
from model. It will shows the estimated value 
of correct predictions for D=1 and D=0 of 
dummy managerial ownership. The expec-
tation-prediction table is sometimes referred to 
as the classification table. The fraction of y=1 
observations that are correctly predicted is 
termed the sensitivity, while the fraction of 
y=0 observations that are correctly predicted is 
known as specificity. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive result for independent 
variables: 
Table 1. Descriptive for Leverage 
LEVt Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
(0, 0.2) 0.047739 0.059230 263 
(0.2, 0.4) 0.297711 0.055023 82 
(0.4, 0.6) 0.502611 0.058538 86 
(0.6, 0.8) 0.696760 0.059989 101 
(0.8, 1) 0.894763 0.055135 108 
All 0.386249 0.335090 640 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive for Dividend 
DIVt Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
(0, 0.5) 0.047827 0.094597 620 
(0.5, 1) 0.682261 0.173836 13 
(1, 1.5) 1.090866 0.042248 3 
(1.5, 2) 1.803455 0.193305 3 
(2, 2.5) 2.393162 NA 1 
All 0.077497 0.211783 640 
 
Table 1 and 2 shows descriptive of two 
main variables, which are leverage and 
dividend. Level of leverage largely disperses 
with mean of 0.386. Almost 96% of sample 
paid small amount of dividend with only 0.047 
dividend yield to shareholders. Total 
observations are 640 (80 firms) with period of 
analysis from 1993 to 2001. 
Table 3-showed leverage and dividend 
variable significantly affect managerial 
ownership one-year later (–0.507237 and –
2.839046) as predicted earlier. The relation-
ships are negative and significant. McFadden 
R
2
 showed significant increase to 0.060144 
compared with 0.058508 from Mahadwartha 
(2002b).  
Leverage policy variable (LEVt) influenced 
managerial ownership (DMOWNt+1) with 
significant result (-0.507237) at 0.05. Dividend 
policy variable (DIVt) influenced managerial 
ownership (DMOWNt+1) with significant result 
(-2.839046) at 0.01. The magnitude of 
dividend policy parameter (-2.839046) is 
higher than leverage policy (-0.507237). Size 
(DSIZEt) is negative (-0.593451) significant at 
0.01. 
Control variables IOSBM, DSIZE and 
DCRS also significant. Size of the firm is 
matter when company engages in managerial 
ownership program. Size, investment oppor-
tunity and economic crisis influenced lead 
managerial ownership by negative sign. Before 
crisis and within crisis period showed different 
behavior in financial policy and managerial 
ownership.  
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Table 3. Logit Model with compared result from Mahadwartha (2002b) 
 DMOWNt+1 DMOWNt 
Predict  Mahadwartha(2002b) 
Constant 
 –0.507237 
(–2.633901)*** 
–0.396933 
(–2.215737)** 
LEVt (–) 
–0.874824 
(–2.459224)** 
–0.738048 
(–2.217768)** 
DIVt (–) 
–2.839046 
(–2.848379)*** 
–2.438077 
(–2.765506)*** 
DSIZEt 
 –0.593451 
(–2.641227)*** 
–0.492879 
(–2.315441)** 
DCRSt 
 –0.490278 
(–2.263945)** 
–0.760215 
(–3.639324)*** 
IOSBMt 
 –0.050146 
(–1.679444)** 
 
McFadden R
2
  0.060144 0.058508 
() z-statistic 
*** Significant at 0.01 
**   Significant at 0.05  
*     Significant at 0.10 
 
Table 4 showed correct classifications 
obtained when the predicted probability is less 
than or equal to the cutoff and the observed 
y=0, or when the predicted probability is 
greater than the cutoff and the observed y=1. 
423.73 of the Dep=0 observations and 26.73 of 
the Dep=1 observations are correctly classified 
by the estimated model. As a whole, model 
correctly estimate 71.79% from total of 640 
observations as compared with Mahadwartha 
(2002b) that only 69.43%. It shows that the 
predictability power is increase for leverage 
and dividend to predict managerial ownership 
one-year later.   
 
Table 4. Compared Expectation-Prediction (Classification) Table with Mahadwartha (2002b) 
 
 
 
DMOWNt+1 
DMOWNt 
 Mahadwartha (2002b) 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
E(# of Dep=0) 432.73 90.27 523.00 416.94 99.06 516.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 90.27 26.73 117.00 99.06 32.94 132.00 
Total 523.00 117.00 640.00 516.00 132.00 648.00 
Correct 432.73 26.73 459.46 416.94 32.94 449.88 
% Correct 82.74 22.85 71.79 80.80 24.96 69.43 
% Incorrect 17.26 77.15 28.21 19.20 75.04 30.57 
Total Gain* 1.02 4.57 1.67 1.17 4.59 1.87 
Percent Gain** 5.59 5.59 5.59 5.76 5.76 5.76 
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DISCUSSION 
Mahadwartha (2002a), and Mahadwartha 
and Hartono (2002) investigate interdepen-
dency of leverage and dividend policy with 
managerial ownership, and find significant 
result that support agency theory. 
Mahadwartha (2002b) investigate relationship 
between managerial ownership with dividend 
and leverage policy without any 
interdependency relationship between those 
two policies. This paper also investigates 
relationship between managerial ownership 
with dividend and leverage policy without any 
interdependency relationship between those 
two policies, but using lead managerial 
ownership. The paper try to investigate the 
predictive power of leverage and dividend 
policies to probability managers engage in 
managerial ownership one-year later. 
The magnitude coefficient of regression 
model is increase if leverage and dividend 
predict managerial ownership one-year later. 
Comparing with Mahadwartha (2002b) result. 
Management will engage in managerial 
ownership program after they signaled about 
dividend increase and leverage increase, 
definitely improved the performance of the 
firm. Other point of view, is an increase in 
dividend will lower firm specific risk because 
its motivate manager to own the company’s 
shares. 
The lower leverage level will leads to 
higher probability firms engage in managerial 
ownership program at t+1 and the higher 
probability managers to fill the program. Less 
leverage will increase the probability a firm to 
engage in managerial ownership program to 
multiply the effect of reduced agency cost of 
debt with the reduction in agency cost of 
equity. 
The lower dividend level will leads to 
higher probability firms engage in managerial 
ownership program at t+1 and the higher 
probability managers to fill the program. 
Lower dividend will increase the probability a 
firm to engage in managerial ownership 
program to maintain the effectiveness of 
reducing agency cost of equity. Since there is a 
managerial ownership, the usefulness of 
dividend policy to control agency cost of 
equity will lower.  
The magnitude of dividend policy 
parameter is higher than leverage policy. The 
result proved dividend policy as substitution 
policy for managerial ownership to control 
agency cost of equity. Partially this result also 
support substitution hypothesis. Dividend as 
bonding mechanism for manager prevents the 
use of firm free cash flow for perquisites act. 
Size negatively and significant related to 
managerial ownership. The result supported 
previous empirical studies that include size as 
firm specific variable for decision-making in 
financial policy of the firm. Lower level of size 
will increase the probability firm engage in 
managerial ownership because management 
only needs a small portion of their wealth to 
capture a significant portion of firm shares. 
Thus managerial ownership program will be 
more effective for small firm. 
Period of crisis (DCRSt) as control varia-
bles are significant. Crisis dummy variable 
showed differences in behavior of the firm 
before and while crisis. Managers less attracts 
for managerial ownership programs during 
crisis because higher risk and lower return on 
firm performance. Managers know better about 
firm’s business risk, thus the behavior in 
managerial ownership (whether they engage or 
not) can be signaled for internal conditions of 
the firm. 
Investment opportunity (IOSBMt) is 
negative significant. The result showed that the 
lower book to market or higher investment 
opportunity would increase manager’s willing-
ness to fill managerial ownership program one-
year later. It is consistent with rational 
behavior of economics, that human will 
maximize his/her utility, or wealth in 
investment point of view. This paper also run 
the regression of no-lead managerial 
ownership (DMOWNt) with IOSBMt as 
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dependent variable, and found no significant 
result regarding the relationship of investment 
opportunity to managerial ownership in current 
year. It strengthens the result that investment 
opportunity only effecting managerial 
ownership in latter year/period. 
CONCLUSION 
The result significantly supports 
Mahadwartha (2002b) that leverage and 
dividend policies can be used to predict 
probability of managers to engage in 
managerial ownership program one-year later. 
Research in managerial ownership will lead to 
broad conclusion that managerial ownership is 
important in controlling agency problems, 
beside the use of debt and dividend. The 
robustness of model also supported by 
previous empirical study conducted by 
Mahadwartha (2002a), Mahadwartha (2002b), 
and Mahadwartha and Hartono (2002) for 
Indonesian capital market. 
The result also showed negative signs and 
an increased magnitude of dividend and 
leverage policy to managerial ownership. It 
showed a substitution relationship of 
managerial ownership to dividend and leverage 
policy, as predicted by agency theory. 
Future research should expand sample size, 
not only manufacture firms but also include 
other industries covered by Jakarta Stock 
Exchange and Surabaya Stock Exchange. 
Other firm specific variables such as 
diversification losses, internal cash flow, etc 
should also include as variables that influenced 
managerial ownership program. 
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